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RESUMEN: El presente artículo examina el principio de legalidad (TEU, 
artículo 2) y su aplicación a los derechos sociales y económicos. El trabajo analiza qué 
se entiende por el concepto de “principio de legalidad” y afirma que, como mínimo, 
debe significar que las Instituciones de la UE y sus Estados Miembros tienen la 
obligación de actuar de acuerdo a la ley, incluidas las obligaciones legales 
internacionales. Asimismo, el artículo analiza la medida en la que los Estados 
Miembros de la UE acatan el derecho de asociación sindical, el derecho a la 
negociación colectiva y el derecho de huelga, conforme a los acuerdos 87 y 98 de la 
OIT y los artículos 5 y 6 de la Carta Social Europea. Mediante el examen de los 
informes de los órganos supervisores, se muestra que la gran mayoría de los Estados 
Miembros incumplen una o más obligaciones de entre estas disposiciones, y que 
muchos de ellos se ven obligados a vulnerar las mismas como resultado de las acciones 
y exigencias de las instituciones de la UE. A pesar de los intentos de la Comisión 
Europea de otorgar contenido al principio de legalidad, hemos alcanzado una posición 
en el plano social en la que el estado de derecho ha quedado eclipsado, con las 
profundas consecuencias que esta situación supone para la democracia y el futuro de la 
Unión. 
ABSTRACT: This article examines the principle of the rule of law (TEU, article 
2) and its application to social and economic rights. The paper considers what is 
meant by the rule of law, and contends that it as a minimum it must mean that EU 
institutions and member states must act in accordance with the law, including 
international legal obligations. The paper considers the extent to which EU member 
states comply with the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively and the right 
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to strike in accordance with ILO Conventions 87 and 98 and the European Social 
Charters Articles 5 and 6. It is shown from an examination of the reports of the 
supervisory bodies that the overwhelming majority of Member States are in breach of 
one or more of their obligations under these various provisions, and that many are 
pushed into non-compliance by the actions and demands of the EU institutions. 
Despite attempts by the Commission to give substance to the rule of law, we have 
moved in the social sphere to a position in which the rules of law has been eclipsed, 
with profound implications for democracy and the future of the Union. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Órganos Supervisores, Acuerdos de la OIT, 
Incumplimiento de Obligaciones, Estados Miembro. 
KEYWORDS: Supervissory bodies, ILO conventions, breach obligations, 
Member States. 
 
I 
On 15 July 2015, the British government’s Trade Union Bill was introduced to 
Parliament. The Bill contains a wide range of restrictions on trade union freedom, 
which appear to contravene a number of ILO Conventions ratified by the United 
Kingdom. The government’s proposals (which will be enacted before this paper is 
published) will impose new restrictions on the right to organise, the right to workplace 
representation, and the right to bargain collectively. They will also impose new 
restrictions on both the right to strike, and trade union political activity, while 
exposing trade union administration to new and unjustified levels of State 
surveillance.1 
The government’s attack on trade unions is to be seen in the context of a system 
in which trade unions are already very highly regulated, as a result of a number of 
restrictions on trade union freedom introduced by the Conservative governments from 
1979 to 1997. Although the Labour governments from 1997 to 2010 introduced a 
                                                     
1 For a critique, see K D Ewing and John Hendy QC, Protect the Right to Strike – Kill the 
Bill (Institute of Employment Rights, 2015). For a more scholarly account, see M Ford and 
T Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness … Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in the 
Trade Union Bill 2015’ (2016) 45 ILJ (forthcoming). 
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number of reforming measures,2 these latter restrictions were largely unaffected, the 
Blair-Brown governments apparently comfortable to live with Tony Blair’s promise on 
the eve of his landslide election victory, to the effect that under a Labour government 
British ‘even after the changes we do propose, Britain will still have the most restrictive 
laws on trade unions in the Western world’.3 
Yet it is not only the Trade Union Bill that contains proposals for change. On the 
same day that the Bill was published, the government published draft regulations to 
amend a law introduced in 2003 relating to the use of agency workers in a strike or 
industrial action.4 It will now be possible for agency workers to be used as strike-
breakers.5 In addition, on 6 August 2015, it was announced that the Trade Union Bill 
would be amended, it now being proposed to ‘abolish the check off across all public 
sector organisations,’ as part of ‘curtailing the public cost of ‘facility time’ subsidies. 
These latter proposals did not expressly appear in the government’s election manifesto 
in 2015.6 
It is as clear as night follows day that these various provisions will violate not only 
a number of important ILO Conventions ratified by the United Kingdom, but a 
number of other international treaty obligations as well. It is also true, however, that 
although these are extreme measures, the United Kingdom is not an island of 
deregulation. An article we posted on an ITUC website about the Bill attracted 
commentary from Canada where we were told that: 
In Canada we are in the middle of a federal election. Recently, we have 
seen federal labour laws enacted that have contained some of the dampening 
aspects of the British Trade Union Bill. If the far-Right Conservatives get re-
                                                     
2 The ILO Committee of Experts has critically examined many of these restrictions, as has 
the European Committee of Social Rights Committee. On the former see K D Ewing, 
Britain and the ILO (Institute of Employment Rights, 2nd ed, 1994). On the Social Charter, 
see most recently Council of Europe, European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 
XX-3 (2014).  
3 The Times, 31 March 1997. This claim was repeated in The Guardian, 27 April 1997, in 
an extended interview with three prominent journalists. 
4 The Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003 
prohibit employment businesses ‘from providing agency workers to cover the duties 
normally performed by an employee of an organisation who is taking part in a strike or 
other industrial action, or to cover the work of an employee covering the duties of an 
employee taking part in a strike or other industrial action (SI 2003, No 3319, reg 7). 
5 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Hiring Agency Staff During Strike Action, 
15 July 2015 (BIS/15/416). 
6  The Conservative Party manifesto said only that a Conservative government would 
‘legislate to ensure trade unions use a transparent opt-in process for union subscriptions’ (p 
19). 
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elected in this country, we will most certainly see more of the same brought 
down with a hard fist. If the centre-Right Liberals are elected in a majority we 
can expect to see no change in what is there, and most probably similar 
restrictive legislation presented without the anti-labour rhetoric — Liberals 
like to appear as reasonable people.7 
Canada is close to Wisconsin, which appears to be the laboratory for much of the 
right wing agenda now gathering pace throughout the English-speaking world.8 
But to hear in these terms from Canada is of course especially poignant, in view of 
recent monumentally significant decisions on the Supreme Court of Canada 
upholding the core labour rights to bargain collectively and to strike derived from no 
more than the constitutional commitment to ‘freedom of association’.9 There was no 
echo heard in Wisconsin, where on the contrary, the Supreme Court held that ‘no 
matter the limitations or ‘burdens’ a legislative enactment places on the collective 
bargaining process, collective bargaining remains a creation of legislative grace and not 
constitutional obligation’. 10  For the moment the significance of the Canadian 
intervention to the contrary is that it brings home the disjunction between law and 
reality and the power and purposes of the neo-liberal agenda. As such it reveals the 
apparent willingness of governments to operate beyond the law, and the apparent 
powerlessness of courts to change the political weather. In this paper our aim is to 
show that while this may be a practice of national law, it is increasingly also a feature 
of other sources of law, which promised to protect worker and trade union rights.  
Our concern is that the developments in the United Kingdom are evidence not of 
particularly British weakness with legality, but with a global one – one in which 
respect by governments in particular (and corporations by extended license) reveal 
contempt (or disregard if contempt is too strong for weak stomachs) for human rights 
and the rule of law. Governments are willing to work for the erosion of the former and 
to violate the latter where it is expedient to do so. In our view this is now a fact of life 
wherever trade unions encounter the power of the State – in EU law, international 
                                                     
7 Andy Hanson, Replying to ‘If the UK passes this draconian Trade Union Bill, your 
country might be next’, Equal Times, 15 October 2015: http://www.equaltimes.org/if-
the-uk-passes-this-draconian.  
8 For Wisconsin, see New York Times, 9 March 2011 (collective bargaining restraints), 22 
February 2014 (impact of the legislation), and subsequently 9 March 2015 (right to work 
laws). 
9 See Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan [2015] SCC 4, and Mounted 
Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 1.  
10  Wisconsin Teachers Inc v Scott Walker, 2014 WI 99, 31 July 2014: 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=118669. 
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law, and international trade law. But it is especially poignant that this should now be a 
feature of life in the United Kingdom, given the hubris of British lawyers who – in the 
800th anniversary of Magna Carta - claim to have bequeathed the rule of law to the 
world.11 
 
II 
We return to developments in the United Kingdom at a later stage in this paper. 
We turn here to EU law, which makes this contradiction very clear, the proud 
provisions of the EU Treaties a hymn to social democratic values and achievements. 
Singing loudly from the TEU, article 2 proclaims that the Union is ‘founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights’, in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’ (emphasis 
added). Similar values are rehearsed in article 3 which proclaims an obligation on the 
part of the Union to ‘combat social exclusion and discrimination’, and a duty to 
promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity 
between generations and protection of the rights of the child’ (emphasis added).12 
Although unclear and imprecise, it is nevertheless presumed that these provisions 
are meaningful and enforceable. The rule of law in particular expresses something very 
basic, namely that government should be conducted in accordance with the law, and 
that government should have legal authority for whatever it does. In other words: 
government should not break the law; and government should act only within the law. 
There are of course those on the right and left who would argue that the rule of law 
must mean more than simply rule by law, and that the idea of the rule of law means 
that the law must have some basic content to meet the requirements of the principle.13 
This would suggest the rule by ‘good’ law, at which point the principle breaks down. 
It breaks down because of the inevitable disagreement as to what ‘good’ law means for 
this purpose: it is the role of democracy to resolve these conflicts between us.  
                                                     
11 See American Bar Association, Magna Carta and the Rule of Law (2015).  The irony that 
the year of the octo-centenary is the very year the UK government have announced they 
will remove the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights is un-missable. 
12 For further commitments to the rule of law, see Box 1. 
13 For a discussion, see J Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law’, in T 
Campbell, K D Ewing and A Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (2001), ch 
4. 
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Paradoxically, the most vigorous proponents of this idea of the rule of law as the 
rule by ‘good law’ are those writing from the neo-liberal right, with one of the more 
explicit attempts to link the rule of law with substantive outcomes to be found in the 
work of Hayek, the Godfather of neo-liberalism.14 In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek 
wrote that  
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from 
those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the 
former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law.  Stripped of all 
technicalities this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules 
fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee in 
given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.15 
So far, so uncontroversial. But while this emphasizes both the need to act within 
the law, and for laws that restrictions on individual freedom must be prescribed by 
law, Hayek was also to use these principles as a launch pad for an attack on the idea of 
a socialist planned economy, and subsequently on the role of trade unions.  
Trade union rights in particular violated Hayek’s idea that the rule of law 
‘excludes legislation either directly aimed at particular people, or at enabling anybody 
to use the coercive power of the State for the purpose of such discrimination’.16 In the 
United Kingdom the nature of legal protection made it easy for Hayek, following 
constitutional scholars such as Dicey who wrote influentially about the rule of law in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.17 For Hayek and his disciples, the question of 
trade union power was compounded by the legal protection of trade unions in the 
form of what was perceived to be ‘immunity’ from common law liability. British 
labour lawyers greatly under-estimated the rhetorical power (not to mention the 
ineffectiveness) of discarding rights as the clothes for the protection of freedoms.18 
Writing in The Constitution of Liberty in 1960, Hayek was to say that: 
                                                     
14 For an earlier attempt from a different perspective, see Lord Hewart, The New Despotism 
(1929). 
15 F A Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944), p 54. 
16 Ibid, p 62. 
17 A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), a book 
that ran to 10 editions (the most recent in 1959). It is a book with a curiously powerful 
influence and long reach, being relied on by the Venice Commission, below. See also A V 
Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England (2nd ed, 1924). 
18 See A Bogg, ‘The Hero’s Journey: Lord Wedderburn and the ‘Political Constitution’ of 
Labour Law’ (2015) 44 ILJ 299. 
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Public policy concerning labor unions has, in little more than a century, 
moved from one extreme to the other. From a state which little the unions 
could do was legal if they were not prohibited altogether, we have now 
reached a state where they have become uniquely privileged institutions to 
which the general rules of law do not apply.19 
It is easy to see why those of us with a different political outlook might treat the 
rule of law with suspicion. It is easy to see too why the rule of law is viewed with 
hostility by the left, as being no more than the vindication of capitalism and the rule 
of coercive State power.20 But on the left the rule of law had something of an 
habilitation, first as a result of the work of E P Thompson and other historians who 
having no illusions about the nature of law, nevertheless saw some virtue in a 
requirement that the State (even an oppressive State) must act in accordance with clear 
rules and formal authority. It is within such space that abuse can be exposed, that 
power can be held to account, and that small victories can be won.21 If experience has 
shown that law is unlikely to have the transformative and liberating potential that 
pioneering social democrats of the late 19th and early 20th centuries expected, 
important struggles still need to be fought.  
More recently, the habilitation of the rule of law on the left has been 
underpinned by the human rights movement, which has also adopted the latter 
principle as well for its own noble causes. It is easy to see the attraction of the rule of 
law in a neo-liberal world in which governments torture detained suspects, imprison 
people indefinitely without charge or trial, by various means deny access to the courts 
by citizens and others, bully judges who ought otherwise to be independent, and take 
increasingly unaccountable powers of surveillance which have no legal authority. If 
this not a remarkable ideological shift, it may be a reflection of the contentious nature 
of human rights principles, this being territory on which Hayek also seemed 
comfortable, though we have no confidence that his preferred human rights outcomes 
                                                     
19 F A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960), p 267.  This important book is free to 
download at http://www.libertarianismo.org/livros/tcolfh.pdf. It should be studied 
carefully to understand what is now happening in the EU. See also F A Hayek, 1980s 
Unemployment and the Unions (2nd ed, 1984). See also on the significance of Hayek for 
labour law:  Lord Wedderburn, Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour Law 
(1989) 18 ILJ 1. Wedderburn focuses on different  writings by Hayek than the ones 
considered here.  
20 See M Horowitz, ‘The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?’ (1977) Yale Law 
Journal 561. 
21 E P Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (1975), p 266. 
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would be consistent with those of today’s concerned activists. Nevertheless, Hayek was 
to write that: 
Whether, as in some countries, the main applications of the Rule of Law 
are laid down in a Bill of Rights or a Constitutional Code, or whether the 
principle is merely a firmly established tradition, matters comparatively little. 
But it will readily be see that whatever form it takes, any such recognized 
limitations of the powers of legislation imply the limitation of the inalienable 
right of the individual, inviolable rights of man.22 
For our purposes, however, it is unnecessary to seek a reconciliation of right and 
left, perceptions, even if this were possible. We are content that when EU treaties refer 
to the ‘rule of law’, they do so by referring to a discrete principle, albeit one of many 
other principles which include dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity and democracy.23 
As a result it is unnecessary for the rule of law to be inflated to include these various 
principles, and enough that it evokes the fundamental need to ensure that 
governments have legal authority for their actions and that they do not break the law.  
This is not to deny that there is a difference between the rule of law and rule by law, 
the former suggesting certain content beyond legal authority itself. The same idea is 
reflected in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in its decisions on Articles 8(2) – 11(2), 
which permit restrictions on Convention rights where these are ‘in accordance with 
the law’, and where a number of other conditions are met. For these purposes the 
Court has suggested the need for open, clear and predictable laws, without imposing 
any preconditions as to the substance of the law.24 
That is enough for us for present purposes. In our view, the context within which 
the term ‘the rule of law’ is used in the EU treaties and the ECtHR is not one that 
invites deep metaphysical debate about the meaning of ‘law’, but the more 
straightforward consideration of whether the government has legal authority for what 
it does, and whether the government can be restrained when it acts unlawfully. One 
caveat, however, is that the rule of law in this sense knows no boundaries, and no 
artificial distinction between national and international law. This is reinforced by the 
TEU, article 21 where we are told that the European Union’s ‘action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own 
creation’, including democracy, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights. Not only that, but it is expressly provided that the EU is to define 
                                                     
22 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, above, p 63. 
23 On the importance of the rule of law as a discrete principle, see also J Raz, ‘The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 LQR 195. 
24 See Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14, para 67. 
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and pursue common policies and actions in order to ‘consolidate and support 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’. 
Box 1  
The Rule of Law Reinforced 
The commitment to the rule of law in the TEU is reinforced by the 
preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that ‘the 
Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy 
and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by 
establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, 
security and justice’. The key commitment here again is the rule of law, which 
was acknowledged also in the preamble to the European Convention on 
Human Rights some fifty years earlier. The preamble of the latter refers to the 
‘Governments of European countries’ as being ‘like-minded and [having] a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’. 
We also encounter the rule of law in a number of national constitutions, as 
for example in Sweden where ‘public power shall be exercised under the law’, 
and in Spain where the preamble to the Constitution refers to the need to 
‘consolidate a state of law which insures the rule of law as the expression of 
the popular will’. Even the United Kingdom – famously without a written 
constitution – has recognized in legislation the ‘existing constitutional 
principle of the rule of law’ (Constitutional Reform Act 2015, s 1). 
 
III 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the EU legal order is built on a lie, or a 
series of up to 28 lies. The member states collectively may have committed themselves 
to the rule of law (using that term at its most basic and least controversial) but they do 
not observe the commitment, at least in relation to labour rights. How do we know 
that the violation of labour rights is systematic and systemic within the EU, and by 
what objective standard can we measure such things? We can start with the Council of 
Europe’s Social Charters of 1961 and 1996, which not only have the virtue of 
including many labour rights (notably the right to organize, the right to bargain 
collectively and the right to strike), but are also subject to a fairly rigorous process of 
supervision by the respected European Social Rights Committee (succeeding the 
Committee of Independent Experts), now engaged in its 21st cycle of supervision. 
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The Social Charter also has the particular virtue for present purposes of being 
referred to on several occasions in the EU treaties. Apart from confirming their 
commitment to the principles of ‘liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’, in the preamble to the TEU the 
member states also confirmed their attachment to ‘fundamental social rights as defined 
by the European Social Charter…’. Similarly, the TFEU (article 25) provides that 
The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social 
rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 
18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of 
employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible 
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social 
protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of 
human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating 
of exclusion. 
The hat-trick is completed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
again makes clear the importance of the Social Charter as a source of inspiration, as 
well as a source of many of its substantive provisions.25 Continuing with the soccer 
metaphor, the hat-trick might as well have been three own goals, for although all EU 
member states have ratified one or other of the Social Charters, many of these states 
have not accepted all of the provisions of whatever version they have ratified,26 and 
most if not all are in breach of various provisions of the treaty in question. It is neither 
necessary nor possible here to give an account of the full extent of the violations of the 
Social Charter, though it is appropriate to give an account of the scale of the violations 
of articles 5 (right to organize), 6(2) (right to bargain collectively), and 6(4) (right to 
strike).27 
On the right to organise, even a cursory examination of the Social Rights 
Committee’s website reveals that 11 of the 27 EU member states that have accepted it 
                                                     
25 Note also that the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 
1989 also claims to draw inspiration from the Council of Europe’s Social Charter, as well 
as ILO Conventions. 
26 See for example European Social Charter 1961, article 20 – ratifying states required to 
accept a minimum of 5 of the 7 core articles, and a minimum number of articles or 
numbered paragraphs. 
27 The other two paragraphs of article 6 deal with joint consultation (art 6(1)) and dispute 
resolution (art 6 (3)). 
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are in ‘non conformity’ with this basic provision.28 It is true that the 11 do not include 
any of the large member states (with the exception of Poland and the United 
Kingdom), and it is also true that in some cases the extent of the non-conformity is 
narrowly contained (as in the case of Denmark, where there are problems relating to 
seafarers, Ireland and Malta where there are problems in relation to police officers, and 
Portugal where there are problems in relation to the absence of clear criteria of 
representativeness to determine eligibility for membership of the Economic and Social 
Council (a governmental body)). In a number of other countries the concerns were 
more serious, including Bulgaria where there are insufficient remedies for workers 
dismissed because of trade union activities.29 
On the right to bargain collectively, again we find that that 11 of the 27 member 
states that have accepted article 6(2) are not in conformity (Greece being the only 
country not to have accepted either articles 5 or all of 6). There is some overlap 
between the violations of articles 5 and 6(2) (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, 
Latvia, and the United Kingdom), and a number of countries in breach of the latter 
but not the former (Croatia, Hungary, Spain and Slovakia).30 In the case of Denmark 
and Ireland the concerns about seafarers and police officers respectively in relation to 
article 5 spill over to article 6(2).   The most common refrain in relation to article 
6(2), however, is that the country in question does not do enough in practice to fulfill 
its obligation to promote collective bargaining. But in the case of Spain, the 
Committee found unlawful important austerity inspired legislation that permitted 
employers to suspend or dis-apply collective agreements: 
The legitimation of unilateral derogation from freely negotiated 
collective agreements is in violation of the obligation to promote negotiation 
procedures. Accordingly the Committee finds that the situation is in violation 
of Article 6(2) of the 1961 Charter on this point.31 
                                                     
28 Here we are looking only at the 20th and most recent cycle of supervision, which was 
reported in January 2015. Greece is the only EU member state not to have accepted article 
5. 
29  The other countries not in conformity with Article 5 are, Estonia, Latvia and 
Luxembourg. 
30 In relation to Croatia, the data relate to the 19th cycle of supervision, as there are no data 
for the 20th cycle. 
31 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions XX-3 (2014), p 25. The Spanish 
situation is important because it appears to be the first case to come before the Committee 
about austerity driven deregulation, Greece being exempt from such scrutiny (though not 
ILO scrutiny) because of its unique failure to accept article 6(2). The Spanish case is 
revealing for the Committee’s acceptance that member states have a wide margin of 
appreciation in terms of bargaining structures, thereby allowing the radical decentralization 
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We return to the significance of EU inspired austerity measures as a cause of 
member states failure to comply with Social Charter obligations. An examination of 
Article 6(4) on the right to strike to reveal the full extent of the failure of member 
states to live up to their promise to the rule of law.32   Article 6(4) has been accepted 
by 24 of the 28 EU member states (Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Poland being 
the exceptions, despite the fact in two of these cases the right to strike is formally 
recognized in the national constitutions, and despite the unequivocal commitment to 
the Social Charter as a whole in the three EU treaties). In only four cases (Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands and Slovenia) has it been found that the country in question is 
in ‘conformity’ with Article 6(4), a judgment which in the first two cases seems 
incredible given that both Latvia and Lithuania are in breach of Article 6(2) for not 
doing enough to promote collective bargaining, with low levels of collective bargaining 
density in the case of Lithuania in particular.33 
The Social Rights Committee has concluded that 16 member states are in non-
conformity with the right to strike. These include what were once celebrated as the 
great social democracies of western Europe (Germany, France, Italy, Sweden and 
Belgium), as well as some of the states in eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovakia).  The reasons for being in non-conformity are many and 
various, including (i) the restricted purposes for which industrial action may take 
place; (ii) the prohibited categories of workers who may take industrial action; (iii) the 
excessive procedures that must be followed before industrial action may lawfully be 
taken; and (iv) the sanctions that may be applied to those who organize or participate 
in industrial action. In some cases – most notably the United Kingdom (even before 
                                                                                                                                       
of bargaining activity that took place in response to the economic crisis. However, the 
Committee also made clear that the crisis itself was not sufficient justification for 
introducing changes to the collective bargaining regime without first consulting the trade 
unions. Having regard to a decision of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, as 
well as to other considerations, the Social Rights Committee rejected the government’s 
claim that its conduct was justified by the urgency of the situation: ‘The Committee recalls 
that the Contracting States undertook actively to promote the conclusion of collective 
agreements (Statement of Interpretation on Article 6(2), Conclusions I (1969)). It also 
recalls that Article 6(2) entails the obligation to arrange for the participation of those 
concerned, through the intermediary of their representatives, in the drafting of the 
regulations which are to apply to them (Conclusions III (1973), Germany)’ (ibid, p 24).  
32 On the importance of article 6(4) for national jurisprudence, see NV Dutch Railways v 
Transport Unions, FNV, FSV and CNV (1986) 6 International Labour Law Reports 3. 
33 15% collective bargaining coverage of the workforce compared to a 62% European 
average; L Fulton, Worker Representation in Europe (Labour Research Department and 
ETUI, 2013). 
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the Trade Union Act 2016) – there are multiple reasons for the violation of article 
6(4).34 
It is difficult to tell how far these violations of article 6(2) and (4) are a result 
autonomously of the domestic laws and policies of member states, and how much they 
are a result of the austerity policies of the EU imposed on member states. As we have 
seen, it is clear that the Spanish violations are a direct result of the latter, while a 
decision against Sweden under the Collective Complaints procedure is a direct result 
of the decision of the CJEU in the Laval case35. In that case the Social Rights 
Committee found restrictions on the right to strike in domestic legislation 
implementing the Posted Workers Directive in the light of Laval to be a breach of 
article 6(4), as well as article 19(4)(a) and (b) (dealing with the rights of migrant 
workers).36 But whatever the reasons for the violation, it is clear that at least in relation 
to the Social Charter, the commitment to the rule of law by member states rings very 
hollow. 
 
IV 
It is not only the Social Charters. As referred to in note * above, one of the factors 
in the conclusions influencing the Social Rights Committee in relation to Spain were 
the similar conclusions of the ILO Freedom of Association Committee, which had 
considered the matter first.37 Spain is not alone in recent years for having encountered 
difficulties before the CFA, with questions having been asked of both Ireland and 
Greece, the questions in the latter case being so serious as to lead to the appointment 
of an ILO High Level Mission, to which we return.38 These concerns raise more 
general questions about the compliance by member states with their obligations under 
the various ILO Conventions they have ratified, alongside the questions about their 
obligations under the Social Charter. 
                                                     
34 These relate to (i) the limited purposes for which action may lawfully be taken; (ii) the 
excessive procedures that must be followed in advance; and (iii) the sanctions against 
workers for taking part. 
35 Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (18 December 2007). 
36 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees (TCO) v Sweden, Complaint No 85/2012. 
37 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No 2947 (Spain), Report No 371 
(2014). 
38 On the position in Ireland, see ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No 2780 
(Ireland), Report No 363 (2012). 
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It is true of course that ILO Conventions do not figure so visibly in the EU 
treaties as do the Social Charters; indeed there is not a single reference to these 
conventions specifically. Nevertheless, they are clearly covered by the overall 
commitment of member states to promote the rule of law peppered throughout the 
treaties, and they are clearly covered by the commitment made by TEU, article 21 
(referred to above) to consolidate and support ‘the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law’. Convention 87 was also expressly recognized by the 
ECJ in the Viking case,39 as contributing to the recognition of the right to strike ‘as a 
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law the observance of which the Court ensures’ (sic).40 The reference was 
repeated a week later in the Laval decision. 
But this too is empty, not just in relation to the United Kingdom, where some of 
the most egregious violations of ILO standards are to be found.41   If we look at ILO 
Convention 87, we find that Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the UK are in breach for 
a number of reasons.42 Although the process of identifying these breaches is not so 
straightforward or systematic as it is in the case of the Social Charter, nevertheless even 
a cursory examination of recent reports of the ILO Committee of Experts reveal 
multiple violations of ILO Convention 87, article 3 which embraces several of the core 
principles of the right to freedom of expression, that is to say the right to self-
government (‘the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their 
representatives in full freedom’), and the right to act together in pursuit of common 
                                                     
39  Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line, Judgment 11 December 2007. 
40  Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line, above, para 44. But just as importantly, each Member State has 
periodically reaffirmed its commitment to the various ILO Conventions it has ratified.  If 
we take the two core ILO Conventions on freedom of association (Conventions 87 and 98), 
we find that both have been ratified by all 28 EU member states. In each case the vow has 
been renewed in free trade agreements between the EU and Member states on the one hand, 
and third countries on the other, in which there is a firm commitment not only to respect the 
four ILO core principles, but also all ILO Conventions ratified by the Member State in 
question. So David Cameron as British Head of Government signed the EU-Korea FTA 
including a reaffirmation of ‘the commitment to effectively implementing the ILO 
Conventions that Korea and the Member States of the European Union have ratified 
respectively’.  This agreement raises wider questions about the EU’s commitment to the 
rule of law, given the situation in Korea relating to ILO Conventions. This is an agreement 
that smells of commitments that no one ever expects to meet. 
41 See Ewing, Britain and the ILO, above.  The violations cover a wide range of matters, 
but relate mainly to the right to strike, notably the ban on all forms of secondary action. 
42 The account in this and the next three paragraphs is based mainly on the Observations of 
the ILO Committee of Experts.  These may be found on the ILO website. 
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aims and objectives (‘to organise their administration and activities and to formulate 
their programmes’).43 
However, it is in relation to the right to strike that the most serious concerns have 
been raised. Indeed in the two most recent years there are clear concerns about the 
violation of ILO standards on the right to strike by eight member states (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg and Malta), 
while there continue to be unresolved longstanding concerns from other countries 
(such as the United Kingdom), which were not revisited in 2014 or 2015. The only 
sweet spots are Estonia and Lithuania where progress is noted. As might be predicted, 
the concerns are of various kinds, ranging from ballot thresholds (Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic); public sector restrictions (Croatia, Germany and Hungary); the use of 
compulsory arbitration or injunctions to prohibit strikes (Malta and Belgium 
respectively); and the rights of minority unions (Luxembourg).  
Yet, it is not only Convention 87 that presents problems. So does Convention 98 
on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. Concerns have been expressed 
about Bulgaria in relation to the remedies for anti-union discrimination, the lack of 
effective legislation to prevent employer domination of trade unions, and the collective 
bargaining rights of civil service trade unionists (with restrictions extending beyond 
those involved in the administration of the state). Concerns about remedies for anti-
union discrimination were also raised about Croatia, where there have also been 
concerns about the exclusion of some local government workers from collective 
bargaining, as well as more general concerns about the power of government to rewrite 
collective agreements, contrary to the principle that ‘a legal provision which allows one 
                                                     
43 EU member states in breach of the former include Croatia (in relation to longstanding 
concerns about the distribution of trade union assets, presumably an unresolved question of 
the capitalist counter-revolution and the disintegration of Yugoslavia), and Portugal (in 
relation to legislation and judicial practice interfering with trade union internal affairs in 
breach of the principle that ‘national legislation should only lay down formal requirements 
respecting trade union constitutions, except with regard to the need to follow a democratic 
process and to ensure a right of appeal for the members’.  As a result, the Government was 
called upon ‘to initiate discussions with the representative workers’ and employers’ 
organizations in order to examine the legislative provisions in question and their application 
in the light of the abovementioned principle’: ILO Committee of Experts, Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 –  Portugal (2014):  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:3147225. 
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party to modify unilaterally the content of signed collective agreements is contrary to 
the principles of collective bargaining’.44 
The Committee of Experts raised the foregoing themes in connection with 
another six EU Member States in 2014 and 2015 (in addition to major concerns in 
2013 in relation to Romania). Thus, the importance of legislation to deal with anti-
union discrimination has been identified as an issue in relation to Hungary and the 
Netherlands, as in the former case has been the absence of legislation protecting trade 
unions from employer interference or domination. The exclusion of selected groups of 
workers from bargaining rights continues to be identified in Denmark (seafarers) and 
Germany (civil servants not exercising authority in the name of the State),45 while the 
Committee continues to be vexed by legislation in Malta empowering the government 
to rewrite collective agreements: 
The Committee recalls that it had previously requested the Government 
to indicate the measures taken or contemplated with a view to amending 
section 6 of the National Holidays and Other Public Holidays Act, so as to 
ensure that this provision: (i) does not render automatically null and void any 
provisions in existing collective agreements which grant workers the right to 
recover public holidays falling on a Saturday or Sunday; and (ii) does not 
preclude voluntary negotiations in the future over the issue of granting 
workers the right to recover national or public holidays which fall on a 
Saturday or Sunday on the basis of a collective agreement (see 342nd Report 
of the Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 2447, paragraph 
752). The Committee once again requests the Government to indicate the 
measures taken or contemplated with a view to amending section 6 of the 
National Holidays and Other Public Holidays Act.46 
                                                     
44 ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 – Croatia (2015): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_I
D:3187855. 
45 The German case is interesting for highlighting the continuing close relationship between 
ILO Conventions and the ECHR. In this case involving teachers, the Committee refer to a 
decision of the Federal Administrative Court that the ban of teachers’ strikes was 
incompatible with the ECHR following Demir and Baycara v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1345 - 
ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
– Germany (2015): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:3187670 
46 ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 – Malta (2015): 
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These findings in relation to Convention 98 are in addition to the CFA’s findings 
relating to Spain referred to above, and the special case of Greece considered below. 
They are also in addition to direct requests to 5 other countries (Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania), the Committee having been alerted about possible 
violations by the ITUC and national trade union federations. There are also the 
problems encountered by Sweden, as it fumbled to respond to the Laval decision of 
the ECJ.47 For the present, however, we have  
 15 member states in breach of ILO Conventions 87 and/or 98, and 
another three the subject of direct requests; 
 19 member states in breach of the ESC, Arts 5, 6(2) or 6(4), with another 
three protected from scrutiny by not accepting one or more of these 
provisions. 
There is obviously overlap between these two categories. But adding these two 
categories together, we find that concerns have been raised by the supervisory bodies 
under one or both of the ESC and ILO obligations about 22 EU member states in the 
last few years alone. The only exceptions are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Lithuania, 
Poland and Slovenia, and in two of these cases – Austria and Poland – there is no 
acceptance of ESC, Article 6(4). In the case of Finland there is new legislation in the 
pipeline, which will change that country’s clean bill of health, interfering as it does 
with free collective bargaining on working time. And in the case of Lithuania the very 
low levels of collective bargaining coverage suggest that the absence of censure may be 
fortuitous.48 
 
V 
Make whatever excuses you like: the foregoing represents an impoverished idea of 
a Union built on the rule of law. Here we have three core treaties binding member 
states - on what is supposed to be a core activity of the Union – in which a maximum 
of only 6 member states have an unblemished record of compliance. Much of this is of 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_I
D:3187260 
47 ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 – Sweden (2013): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_I
D:3085282 
48 Lithuania is the only EU member state with collective bargaining density levels lower 
than the United Kingdom. 
Keith D. Ewing  – John Hendy QC 
 
 
 
Revista Derecho Social y Empresa nº 4, Diciembre 2015 
ISSN: 2341-135X pág. [97] 
course the direct result of policy agendas being pursued at national level (as in the 
treatment of the public sector), and some of it is influenced by constitutional ideas in 
need of greater flexibility in their application (as in the treatment of civil servants 
(Beamte) in Germany).49 But one of the undercurrents in the discussion so far has been 
the possibility that some of the violations are to be found in measures introduced to 
deal with austerity, which both the European Social Rights Committee and the ILO 
CFA conclude did not justify the measures in question. 
The spectre of austerity haunting Europe raises another concern. Twenty two EU 
member states are unable to demonstrate compliance with core labour rights. In most 
cases that is a matter of choice. In some cases, however, it is clear that the violations 
are a direct breach of austerity measures imposed by the EU’s political institutions. 
This of course compounds rule of law concerns, for here we have violations by 
member states, but also violations by member states imposed by the EU institutions in 
apparent breach of their own treaty obligations set out in TEU, Article 2. If we were 
mathematicians we might say that this was the violation of the rule of law squared. 
There is certainly a whiff of this in the case of Spain referred to above, while it is the 
demands of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF that 
took Greece into violation.50 
It was not possible of course for the Greek trade unions to challenge the austerity 
packages their governments agreed to, as violating the ESC, Articles 5 and 6 (though a 
number of successful challenges based on other articles of the treaty were successful).51 
But it was possible to claim that these imposed changes violated ILO Conventions on 
freedom of association (as well as a raft of other ILO Conventions relating to equality 
and discrimination, which are not considered here). Informed by the exhaustive 
findings of an ILO High Level Mission,52 the ILO Committee of Experts was clearly 
concerned by a number of changes to the way that collective bargaining was to be 
conducted, the Troika’s demands having included the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining and in particular the procedures permitting derogation from sectoral 
agreements by non union associations of workers at enterprise level.  
                                                     
49  Thus, in the case of Germany referred to above, the Committee understood the 
constitutional problems in Germany but reiterated that ‘negotiations need not necessarily 
lead to legally binding instruments so long as account is taken in good faith of the results of 
the negotiations in question’. 
50 International Labour Office, Report on the High Level Mission to Greece (Athens, 19-23 
September 2011) (2011). 
51 See eg Pensioners’ Union of the Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways (ISAP) v Greece, 
Complaint No 78/2012 (violation of article 12)3). 
52 International Labour Office, Report on the High Level Mission to Greece, above. 
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These latter provisions led the Committee of Experts to express ‘deep concern’ 
that the changes – ‘aimed at permitting deviations from higher level agreements 
through ‘negotiations’ with non-unionized structures’ - are ‘likely to have a significant 
– and potentially devastating – impact on the industrial relations system in the 
country’.53 Although the Committee understood that the Greek Government ‘was 
given little choice in the current discussions with the lending institutions but to adopt 
these changes in response to calls for greater flexibility and improved competitiveness 
of the labour market’, the Committee said nevertheless that it ‘deeply regret[ted]’ that 
‘such far-reaching changes were made without full and thorough discussions with all 
the social partners concerned with a view to determining the appropriate flexibility to 
be afforded without wholly risking to undermining the long-established industrial 
relations in the country’.54 This, however, was only the start. 
So, the Committee expressed the fear ‘that the entire foundation of collective 
bargaining in the country may be vulnerable to collapse under this new framework’. 
This was because 90% of the (private sector) workforce was employed in small 
enterprises, in a system where trade unions cannot legally be formed in enterprises 
with less than 20 employees.  In these circumstances,  
granting collective bargaining rights to other types of workers’ 
representation which are not afforded the guarantees of independence that 
apply to the structure and formation of trade unions and the protection of its 
officers and members is likely to seriously undermine the position of trade 
unions as the representative voice of the workers in the collective bargaining 
process.55 
The ‘risk’ that ‘the entire foundation of collective bargaining in the country may 
be vulnerable to collapse’, was said to have been reinforced by the abolition of the 
favourability principle set out [in legislation of 2010 and 2011]. According to the 
Committee of Experts, this had the effect of nullifying the binding nature of collective 
agreements.  
The Committee of Experts has returned to this matter every year since 2012, 
repeating the view in 2014 that the prevalence of small enterprises in the Greek labour 
market meant that the facilitation of association of persons combined with the 
                                                     
53 ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 – Greece (2012): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:2698934. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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abolition of the favourability principle ‘would have a severely detrimental impact upon 
the foundation of collective bargaining in the country’.56 The dramatic effect of the 
former was revealed when it was explained that according to government statistics - 
national occupational collective agreements have gone down from 43 in 
2008 to seven in 2012 whereas firm-level collective agreements have increased 
from 215 in 2008 to 975 in 2012 (706 signed by associations of persons and 
269 signed by trade unions). Moreover, 701 of those agreements signed by 
associations of persons and 76 signed with trade unions have provided for 
wage cuts. Similarly, 313 enterprise level collective agreements have been 
signed in 2013 of which 178 have been signed by associations of persons (156 
providing for wage cuts) and 135 signed by trade unions (42 providing for 
wage cuts).57 
The Committee’s request that the government takes steps ‘to ensure that trade 
union sections could be formed in small enterprises in order to guarantee the 
possibility of collective bargaining through trade union organizations’ continues to fall 
on deaf ears.58 
This is crucially important because it would tend to suggest that the Troika (the 
IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank) were imposing 
conditions on Greece, which were in breach of Greece’s obligations under 
international law. Indeed, it seems that these institutions were wholly indifferent to 
some if not all of these obligations, the HLM being ‘struck by reports’ in relation to 
obligations under ILO Convention 122 (Employment Policy Convention, 1964) ‘that 
in discussions with the Troika employment objectives rarely figure’.59 Although it 
cannot be presumed that the Troika were equally unimpressed by ILO Conventions 
87 and 98 (or any other international legal obligation applying to Greece), there is 
little in the foregoing to suggest that the European Commission and its partners felt in 
                                                     
56 ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 –Greece (2014): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:3149782. 
57 Ibid. 
58  See ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 –  Greece (2015):  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_I
D:3190159 
59 International Labour Office, Report on the High Level Mission to Greece, above, para 
331. 
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any way constrained by these obligations, even if they were known to the negotiating 
team.  
The conduct of the European Commission and the European Central Bank is 
not consistent with TEU, article 2. Yet Greece is not alone, there being evidence of 
Troika interference with attempts in Romania to bring domestic law into line with 
treaty obligations, demanding amendments to new legislation on freedom of 
association. 60  Thus, seeking to persuade the Romanian authorities ‘to limit any 
amendments to Law 62/2011 to revisions necessary to bring the law into compliance 
with core ILO conventions’, IMF and European Commission representatives strongly 
urged the authorities to ‘ensure that national collective agreements do not contain 
elements related to wages and/or reverse the progress achieved with the Labor Code 
adopted in May 2011 (e.g. on working time regulation)’.61 The exclusion of pay from 
collective bargaining would not be compatible with ILO Convention 98.62 
                                                     
60 ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 – Romania (2013): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:3085310. 
61  http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/romania.pdf. It is known too that an agreement 
between employers, government and unions that (amongst other things) the Irish 
Competition Act (a replication of Art. 101TFEU) would be amended so as to overcome a 
provision which had the effect of barring unions from negotiating or enforcing collective 
agreements in respect of self-employed workers, was overruled by the direct intervention of 
the Troika, leaving such workers denied their right to collective bargaining. The agreement 
was ‘Towards 2016: Review and Transitional Agreement 2008-9.’The ILO Committee of 
Experts reported: ‘The Committee had noted the Government’s indication that, during the 
course of the social partnership talks in 2008, it committed itself to introducing legislation 
amending section 4 of the Competition Act to the effect that certain categories of 
vulnerable workers, formerly or currently covered by collective agreements, when engaging 
in collective bargaining, would be excluded from the section 4 prohibition. According to 
the Government, this commitment took into account that there would be negligible negative 
impacts on the economy or on the level of competition and gave consideration to the 
specific attributes and nature of the work involved, subject to consistency with European 
Union (EU) competition rules. Three categories of workers were proposed to be covered by 
the exclusion: freelance journalists, session musicians and voice-over actors. The 
Government indicates that since the social partnership talks took place, the 
EU/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Programme of Financial Support for Ireland has 
been agreed and the authorities have committed themselves to ensuring that no further 
exemptions to the competition law framework will be granted unless they are entirely 
consistent with the goals of the EU/IMF Programme and the needs of the economy. The 
Government indicates that this commitment requires further consideration in the context of 
the EU/IMF Programme.’ See ILO Committee of Experts, Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 –Ireland (2013): 
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VI 
By virtue of the austerity packages imposed in Member States – notably Greece – 
the EU has embarked on a course of action at odds with its own treaty commitment to 
the rule of law. For two reasons – by failing to comply with its own obligations to 
respect the rule of law; and by doing so placing member states in a position where they 
must break the law. In this endeavour the Commission and the Bank have been given 
an extraordinary licence by the CJEU in the Pringle case,63 which created a legal space 
in which the law does not operate. So while English lawyers are familiar with Lord 
Justice Scrutton’s famous aphorism that ‘there must be no Alsatia in England where 
the King's Writ does not run’,64 European lawyers must familiarize themselves with 
the new idea that there may now be an Alsace in France where the EU’s Writ does not 
run.  
But not only does the CJEU stand condemned for its weakness in giving legal 
space to treaty violations, it is also directly responsible for some of the most important 
violations of international legal obligations on the part of member states. Indeed it is 
the CJEU that has taken the lead in undermining the rule of law at EU level, assuming 
of course that the rule of law is not the same as what the CJEU does, or that what the 
CJEU does is the rule of law. We are surely beyond such conceit. For this discussion 
the starting points are the Viking and Laval decisions, which are so well known as not 
now to need repeating. But the effect of these decisions was to violate international 
standards and to put the EU itself and its member states well beyond the scope of 
international law, in a manner not easily consistent with the duty of the Union to 
pursue common policies and actions in order to ‘consolidate and support democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’ (TFEU, article 
21). 
The impact of the Viking decision acknowledging a right to strike subordinate to 
the employers’ economic freedoms, and highly qualified by tight proportionality 
conditions was to be seen very quickly in the BALPA case, which led to a complaint to 
the ILO Committee of Experts from the United Kingdom.65 In that case, British 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:3082151. This was repeated in 2015.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Case C-370/12. Pringle v Ireland, 27 November 2012. 
64 Czarnikow v Roth [1922] 2 KB 478, at p 488. 
65 For a discussion of this case which is otherwise unreported, see K D Ewing and J Hendy 
QC, The New Spectre Haunting Europe (Institute of Employment Rights, 2009), at pp 68-
72. 
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Airways’ pilots were worried about their employer’s decision to base part of its 
operations in France, and the implications this might have for their terms and 
conditions of employment. The union (BALPA) sought various assurances from the 
company, and when negotiations failed the union conducted a strike ballot in 
accordance with the detailed procedures of British law, and otherwise acted in 
accordance with British legislation (which itself has been found to breach ILO and 
Council of Europe standards,66 and which has been the subject of several complaints 
to the ECtHR).  
The employer threatened BALPA with legal action not because the union had 
acted in breach of domestic law, but because its proposed action would constitute a 
breach of the employer’s right under the EC Treaty, article 43 (now TFEU, article 49) 
following the decision in Viking. BALPA then took the unusual step of seeking a 
declaration in the High Court that its action was lawful, while the employer 
counterclaimed seeking ‘unlimited damages, including damages in respect of damage 
alleged to have been sustained by it by the mere fact that BALPA had served notice to 
ballot for strike action’.67 The union’s action for a declaration was discontinued only 
three days after it commenced, and the industrial action was discontinued for fear that 
it might be unlawful, with the risk that the legal proceedings would drag on 
indefinitely and that the union might be liable for unlimited damages for all the losses 
allegedly suffered by the employer as a result of the dispute. 
Having discontinued the domestic litigation, BALPA made a complaint to the 
ILO Freedom of Association Committee. A complaint that was referred in turn to the 
ILO Committee of Experts. The latter has now reported twice on the complaint, 
making it clear in uncompromising terms that the effect of Viking as reflected in 
BALPA was to take the United Kingdom even deeper in breach of Convention 87. In 
2010, the Committee of Experts challenged the very basis of the decision in Viking by 
reporting that ‘when elaborating its position in relation to the permissible restrictions 
that may be placed upon the right to strike, it has never included the need to assess the 
proportionality of interests bearing in mind a notion of freedom of establishment or 
freedom to provide services’.68 In the same report, the Committee also observed ‘with 
                                                     
66 See http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/countrylist.pl?country=(United+Kingdom). 
67 K D Ewing and J Hendy QC, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baycara’ (2010) 
39 ILJ 2. 
68  ILO Committee of Experts, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 –United Kingdom (2010): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_I
D:2314990. The Committee has only suggested that ‘in certain cases, the notion of a 
negotiated minimum service in order to avoid damages which are irreversible or out of all 
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serious concern’, the practical limitations on the effective exercise of the right to strike 
of the BALPA [members] in this case’. According to the Committee,  
the omnipresent threat of an action for damages that could bankrupt the 
union, possible now in the light of the Viking and Laval judgments, creates a 
situation where the rights under the Convention cannot be exercised.69 
When it revisited this matter in 2011, the Committee again expressed concern 
that ‘the doctrine that is being articulated in these ECJ judgments is likely to have a 
significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike in practice in a manner 
contrary to [Convention 87]’. 70  The British government had responded to the 
Committee’s 2010 observations by contending that the problems in the BALPA case 
arose as a result of its obligations derived from EU treaties, which it was powerless 
unilaterally to address by domestic legislation. In once again recalling its ‘serious 
concern’, the Committee responded by observing that 
protection of industrial action in the country within the context of the 
unknown impact of the ECJ judgments referred to by the Government 
(which gave rise to significant legal uncertainty in the BALPA case), could 
indeed be bolstered by ensuring effective limitations on actions for damages so 
that unions are not faced with threats of bankruptcy for carrying out 
legitimate industrial action. The Committee further considers that a full 
review of the issues at hand with the social partners to determine possible 
action to address the concerns raised would assist in demonstrating the 
importance attached to ensuring respect for this fundamental right. The 
                                                                                                                                       
proportion to third parties, may be considered and if agreement is not possible the issue 
should be referred to an independent body (see 1994 General Survey on Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining, para 160). The Committee is of the opinion that 
there is no basis for revising its position in this regard’. 
69 Ibid. Although there was no decision of the domestic courts in the BALPA case, the 
Committee considered that there was nevertheless ‘a real threat to the union’s existence and 
that the request for the injunction and the delays that would necessarily ensue throughout 
the legal process would likely render the action irrelevant and meaningless’. The 
Committee was also concerned that ‘in the current context of globalization, such cases are 
likely to be ever more common, particularly with respect to certain sectors of employment, 
like the airline sector, and thus the impact upon the possibility of the workers in these 
sectors of being able to meaningfully negotiate with their employers on matters affecting 
the terms and conditions of employment may indeed be devastating’ (ibid). 
70  ILO Committee of Experts, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 –United Kingdom (2011): 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMM
ENT_ID:2322470. 
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Committee therefore once again requests the Government to review the 
[domestic legislation], in full consultation with the workers’ and employers’ 
organizations concerned, with a view to ensuring that the protection of the 
right of workers to exercise legitimate industrial action in practice is fully 
effective, and to indicate any further measures taken in this regard.71 
Whether or not the British government could or would want to do anything in 
response to the Viking decision, are of course contested questions. It remains the case 
nevertheless that the United Kingdom was placed in a position where it was bound to 
break its legal obligations by a decision which the ILO Committee of Experts made 
clear is not consistent with international law, which incidentally applies to all EU 
member states. In taking this step in clear breach of treaty obligations, and in placing 
member states in this invidious position, the approach of the CJEU in Viking is all the 
more lamentable for the fact that it was wholly unnecessary and easily avoidable, 
particularly in light of the court’s full recognition of the importance of the right to 
strike in international instruments such as the European Social Charter and ILO 
Convention 87, as well as EU instruments such as the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of Workers and the EU Charter of Rights. 
Several ways forward that would have respected the EU’s obligation to the rule of 
law (an obligation that applies to the Court as it does to other institutions) were 
presented to the Court in the course of the proceedings by the Danish and Swedish 
governments as interveners and by the respondent parties themselves.72   These would 
have allowed the court to have carved out a principled exception to protect 
international legal obligations based on (i) the competence of the EU, (ii) the role of 
fundamental rights as taking priority over fundamental freedoms, and/or (iii) the 
application by analogy of the Albany principle to the fundamental freedoms.73 With 
the benefit of hindsight the ILO Committee of Experts has shown just what a grave 
misjudgment it was not to embrace one or more of these options, the Court seeking to 
reconcile the irreconcilable in an ultimately unconvincing way, repeating the 
performance a week later in the Laval case, to similar effect. 
 
 
                                                     
71 Ibid. 
72 C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line, above, paras 39 – 48. 
73  Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-05751. See now FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat 
der Nederlanden, 4 December 2014.  
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Box 2 
The CJEU and the Rule of Law 
In Alemo-Herron,74 the CJEU held that workers in a privatised enterprise 
were to be denied the benefits of a national collective agreement to which they 
were contractually entitled. This was on the basis that the Acquired Rights 
Directive EC 23/2001 had to be read consistently with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, article 16 which guarantees the right to conduct a 
business. Consequently, the CJEU held that the new owner had to have the 
freedom:  
‘to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party 
and to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its 
employees with a view to its future economic activities. Because the private owner 
could not participate in the continuing collective bargaining machinery (which 
was confined to public employers and unions), the Court held 75  that its 
‘contractual freedom is seriously reduced to the point that such a limitation is 
liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business’.76 
The employer was thus held to be entitled to disregard the term tying the 
workers’ wages to the increases set under the collective bargaining arrangements by 
which they had contracted to be bound. The use of article 16 (the right to conduct a 
business) so as to permit an employer to renege on its contractual obligations is 
extraordinary enough, while the Court’s use of article 16 to abrogate employees’ rights 
appears to be contrary to previous CJEU case-law.77 But most strikingly, the right of 
the workers to the benefit of collective bargaining protected by article 28 of the 
Charter, in article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (in consequence 
of Demir and Baykara v Turkey), in article 6 of the European Social Charter, and in 
ILO Convention 87 were apparently not worthy of even a mention. It is assumed that 
the point was argued. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
74 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd, 18 July 2013. 
75 Ibid, para 35. 
76 Ibid, para 33. 
77  J Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of 
Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law’, (2013) 42 ILJ 
434 at 441-443. 
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VII 
In light of the foregoing it is perhaps timely that in 2014 the European 
Commission should issue a Communication on A New Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law.78 However, the reason for this Communication was not the shameful role 
of the Commission (or the Court) in undermining the rule of law, to which the 
authors of the Communication were evidently indifferent. According to a paper 
posted by the Robert Schuman Foundation, the concern appears rather to have been 
backsliding on rule of law commitments by new accession states, some of which were 
highlighted in a speech by Viviene Reding in 2013, which was said to refer to  
(i) The French government's attempt in summer 2010 to secretly 
implement a collective deportation policy aimed at EU citizens of Romani 
ethnicity despite contrary assurances given to the Commission that Roma 
people were not being singled out;  
(ii) The Hungarian government's attempt in 2011 to undermine the 
independence of the judiciary by implementing an early mandatory 
retirement policy; and  
(iii) The Romanian government's failure to comply with key judgments 
of the national constitutional court in 2012.79 
No reference here of course to labour rights or – as already pointed out – the 
Commission’s own role in undermining the rule of law, the very idea being no doubt 
implausible for a behemoth that claims to the ‘the guardian of the Treaties and has 
responsibility for ensuring the respect of the values on which the EU is founded and of 
protecting the general interest of the Union’.80 Assuming a responsibility to play an 
‘active role’ for this purpose, the Commission’s Communication on A New Framework 
to Strengthen the Rule of Law is about building on a Barroso proposal in his ‘state of 
the union’ speech to the European Parliament in 2012, where he referred to the need 
                                                     
78 European Commission, COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
79  Robert Schuman Foundation, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU:  On the 
Commission’s Pre-Article 7 Procedure as a Timid Step in the Right Direction’, European 
Issue No 356 (2015): http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0356-
upholding-the-rule-of-law-in-the-eu-on-the-commission-s-pre-article-7-procedure-as-
a-timid-step.  
80 European Commission, Communication on A New Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, above, p 2. 
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for a ‘better developed set of instruments’ for promoting the rule of law’.81 These 
would apply, however, only in the case of threats of a systemic nature, defined to mean 
The political, institutional and/or legal order of a Member State as such, 
its constitutional structure, separation of powers, the independence or 
impartiality of the judiciary, or its system of judicial review including 
constitutional justice where it exists, must be threatened – for example as a 
result of the adoption of new measures or of widespread practices of public 
authorities and the lack of domestic redress. The Framework will be activated 
when national ‘rule of law safeguards’ do not seem capable of effectively 
addressing these threats.82 
Where there are systemic violations of the rule of law of the kind referred to, it is 
nevertheless proposed that these will lead to interventions by the Commission, of a 
kind which itself might be thought to raise eyebrows on rule of law grounds.83 There 
seems to be a pattern emerging within EU law whereby wide and meaningful powers 
of an administrative nature are conferred on the Commission, these powers being 
largely beyond any form of effective legal supervision. So far as the proposed rule of 
law procedure is concerned, it is to begin with a dialogue between the State in 
question and the Commission, culminating in ‘rule of law recommendations.’84 The 
latter would identify the Commission’s concerns and propose ways by which they 
could be addressed, designed to fill the gap between the current choice of ineffective 
political persuasion, and the ‘nuclear option’ of TEU, article 7 leading to the possible 
suspension of EU membership rights, about which there is obvious reluctance. 
It is clear that although this is a procedure designed for systemic problems within 
States, it is not designed for systemic problems involving all states, or systemic 
problems within the Commission itself.   There is thus no one to guard the guardian, 
the guardian apparently not in need of being guarded. Nevertheless the weaknesses of 
the Commission’s proposals also reveal how they could be strengthened, at least in the 
case of the systemic problems involving all states. There is no reason why the 
procedure could not be extended to such cases, though the potentially fatal weakness 
of such an initiative is the requirement that the procedure would have to be invoked 
by the Commission. That is unlikely to be credible if the Commission is indifferent to 
the rights being violated, or if the Commission is itself demanding policy changes that 
                                                     
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, p 6. 
83 See the not unrelated concerns of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 
above. 
84 European Commission, Communication on a New Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, above, p 8. 
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lead inevitably to violations, or if the violations arise as a result of the decisions of the 
Court.  
Apart from the proposal itself and its limitations, the other important feature of 
the Commission’s Communication on A New Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law 
is its attempt to define what is meant by the rule of law. As we explained above, the 
rule of law has been a highly contentious principle in the common law world, where it 
has been the subject of extensive discussion. It is clear, however, that the rule of law is 
not a single principle, but a series of contestable principles, each more expansive than 
the other, and each more contestable than the other. But the first principle (and 
perhaps the only principle, and one which we consider to be uncontroversial) is that 
those who make the law should obey the law. In too much of a rush to climb the 
ladder to the next principle, however, this is a principle to which the Commission pays 
insufficient attention, though it does acknowledge that the rule of law is important 
because it  
makes sure that all public powers act within the constraints set out by 
law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and 
under the control of independent and impartial courts.85 
This is very unconvincing. According to the Commission, the rule of law is 
necessary in order to ensure that the law is obeyed; not that obedience to the law is a 
necessary feature of the rule of law. This is a crucial distinction when it comes to the 
meaning of legal obligations such as those in TEU, article 2. While we insist that this 
means that member states and EU institutions must comply with legal obligations, the 
Commission is saying on the contrary that article 2 means that there must be 
institutional arrangements in place to enable this obligation to be met, but without 
acknowledging the obligation sustained by the infrastructure itself. Intentional or 
otherwise, this is a brilliant sleight of hand, which not only reveals too much of a 
hurry to get to the more contestable second and third rungs on the rule of law ladder, 
but also too much of a hurry to confuse and smother the rule of law with other 
principles such as equality, democracy and human rights, to which it may be related 
but from which it is distinct.86 
To say that the rule of law does not necessarily imply democracy or 
respect for fundamental rights, is not to deny the importance of the principle 
or that it is an essential feature of a democratic society. Given that the 
principle is operating alongside so many other complementary principles of 
equal value, however, it is not clear why it is necessary to inflate the rule of 
                                                     
85 Ibid, pp 3-4.  
86 See also Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, above. 
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law far beyond the first rung. We accept the view expressed in Demir and 
Baycara and elsewhere that the rule of law implies something about the 
quality of the law (certainty, predictability and foreseeability), as well as the 
need for an independent judiciary (how else can there be a rule of law?).87 But 
to go much further up the ladder not only deflects attention from this core 
obligation, but threatens to enter irreconcilably contested territory such as 
that occupied by Hayek and others There is consequently much to be said for 
the view that in missing the main point about the rule of law, the European 
Commission’s Communication has adopted a definition that is at best over-
elaborate, and at worst intentionally obfuscatory.  
Thus, according to the Commission the key elements of the rule of law are: 
 Legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and 
pluralistic process for enacting laws; 
 Legal certainty; 
 Prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; 
 Independent and impartial courts; 
 Effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; 
 Equality before the law.88 
 These elements are based largely on the work of the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission in 2011,89 which claimed that the foregoing now 
represented a consensus,90 though on what empirical or scientific basis 
this was determined is unknown. It is certainly not uncontroversial, with 
the fifth bullet point casually eliding from the form of the law and its 
administration into the substance and content of the law.91 There is, 
however, one redeeming feature of the Venice Commission’s 
recommendations. Unlike the European Commission, the latter is quite 
clear that the element of legality (the first bullet point) ‘implies that the 
law must be followed’, and ‘applies not only to individuals, but also to 
                                                     
87  Demir and Baycara v Turkey, above, at para 153 (referring to ‘legal certainty, 
foreseeability and equality before the law’). 
88 European Commission, Communication on A New Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, above, p 4. 
89 Council of Europe, Report on the Rule of Law - Adopted by the Venice Commission at 
its 86th plenary session (25-26 March, 2011). 
90 Ibid, para 35. 
91  This was an issue also identified by the House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Committee: HC 83 – xliii (2013-14). 
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authorities, public and private’.92 As already suggested, for our purposes, 
that is all that is needed. No more, no less. 
 
VIII 
Returning to the United Kingdom, as already pointed out, the principle of the 
rule of law now has statutory recognition, with the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, 
section 1 including a provision inserted at the request of the judges. This provides that 
the provision of the Act (which makes provision for a new Supreme Court, the 
removal of the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary) and reformed the process of 
judicial appointment) did not ‘adversely affect’ the ‘existing constitutional principle of 
the rule of law’. The ‘rule of law’ is not defined for these purposes, prompting a senior 
judge to deliver an important public lecture in 2006 to explore its meaning for the 
purposes of the 2005 Act.93 
Lord Bingham’s eight elements of the rule of law were very like the six elements 
subsequently expressed by both the Venice Commission and the European 
Commission respectively. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the apparent influence 
of Lord Bingham’s work on the former,94 and the influence of the former on the latter. 
But Bingham’s list included one notable clarification, Bingham making clear that  
The existing principle of the rule of law requires compliance by the state 
with its obligations in international law, the law which whether deriving from 
treaty or international custom and practice governs the conduct of nations. I 
do not think this proposition is contentious. 95 
The British government clearly disagrees, it being reported that the Ministerial 
Code has been amended to remove specific references to the duty of ministers to 
comply with international law. Under previous governments the Code addressed the 
‘overarching duty on ministers to comply with the law including international law and 
treaty obligations and to uphold the administration of justice. Under the Cameron 
government, it addresses simply the duty to comply with ‘the law’.96 
                                                     
92 Council of Europe, above, para 36. 
93 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 CLJ 67. 
94 Venice Commission, above, para 36. 
95 Bingham, above. See also T Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011). 
96 Ministerial Code (October, 2015), para 1.2. The Ministerial Code sets out the standards 
of behaviour expected of ministers in the conduct of public affairs and in their private lives. 
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It is true that the ‘law’ for this purpose could include both domestic and 
international law. The removal of international law from the text and the political row 
that it provoked would suggest, however, that this is not what is intended.97 So, apart 
from removing one small restraint from Prime Minister’s wishing to engage in illegal 
warfare (albeit a restraint of uncertain legal obligation), the change also removes from 
other ministers any need to even go through the formality of considering whether 
legislative proposals are consistent with treaty obligations. As the British government is 
moving to loosen rule of law constraints on ministers, it is little wonder that it should 
also be sceptical about even the modest (and flawed) Communication on A New 
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. The British government has made it clear 
that it considers the latter to be unnecessary,98 while the British Parliament’s European 
Scrutiny Committee has also expressed reservations.99 
It is in this context that the Trade Union Bill was introduced by the British 
government, containing provisions which not only violate ILO Conventions 87, 98, 
and 151, as well as the European Social Charter, but probably also the provisions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (on multiple grounds), the substance of 
which these various other treaties inform. This seems to be particularly true of the 
provisions of the Act which prohibit in the public sector the implementation of 
collective agreements about the use of the check off to collect trade union 
subscriptions; as well as provisions allowing ministers to rewrite collective agreements 
(and contracts of employment) dealing with facilities for workplace representation, 
again in the public sector. These are provisions clearly designed to undermine the 
financial and organizational security of public sector trade unionism, in what is a 
partial copy-cat of the Wisconsin initiative. 
The Bill does not of course attack only the financial and organizational security 
of public sector trade unions. Mimicking developments elsewhere in the United 
States, a change to the default rules on trade union political activity will require 
members willing to support this activity to opt in, thereby replacing a system where 
members opposed to this activity had to opt out. The purpose is clearly to diminish 
the political voice of resistance to government policy, just as the new rules on support 
thresholds (40% of those eligible to vote) in strike ballots in the ‘important public 
services’ is designed to diminish the industrial voice of resistance to government 
policy. Although these latter changes will affect all unions (as will other changes on 
strike notice and picketing), the principal target appears to be the public sector where 
                                                     
97  See The Guardian, 26 October 2015, where the government is accused of having 
contempt for international law. 
98 HC 83 – xliii (2013-14). 
99 Ibid. 
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trade unionism is strongest and where tight fiscal discipline has already pre-determined 
a 1% increase in the public sector pay bill over the next five years. 
What is being played out here, however, is a severe tension at the heart of the 
neo-liberal project. There is a compelling ideological desire to redesign the function of 
trade unions (as service rather than regulatory bodies), and a compelling desire to 
reduce the size of the State (and with it the points of resistance to this ambition). But 
as we saw above, one of the underlying principles identified by one of the architects of 
modern neo-liberalism is the rule of law, which at its most basic means that 
governments should only act within the law. The impatience of modern governments, 
however, is such that they are willing to move without legal authority and in the 
process to shatter one of the most sacred icons on which their project was based. In the 
end, the experience of the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the EU reveals the rule 
of law to be no more than a rhetorical device, the core element of which is simply 
ignored by a Europe in which power has displaced law. 
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